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We seem all to agree that the means of discovery is to be an absolute freedom of election of studies for both men and women (laughter and applause). That is a delightful conclusion for a Harvard man (laughter).

EVENING SESSION.

The association reassembled at 7 : 30 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor of presenting to the members of the association Professor Woodrow Wilson of Princeton University.

SPURIOUS VERSUS REAL PATRIOTISM IN EDUCATION.

By PROFESSOR WOODROW WILSON,
of Princeton University.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The subject which has been assigned to me is Spurious as contrasted with Real Patriotism in Education. Why should a man speak this evening on patriotism by way of exhortation? Is not this immediate part of the land, at any rate, full of the voices of patriotic feeling? Are we not now worshipping at the feet of a man whom we conceive to represent the power and the dignity of the nation, a man of moderation and self-possession in peace, as well as of mastery and bravery in war? And is it not true that our hearts, no matter what our opinions may be with regard to questions of policy, are at unison in rejoicing that we can produce such men? It would seem a work of impertinence to speak to a country, or to any persons connected with a country, thus stirred to tell them how they ought to feel with respect to matters of patriotism.

And yet I think you will agree with me, after very little reflection, that patriotism is, after all, not essentially a sentiment. Patriotism expresses itself in sentiment, but it does not consist of sentiment. Patriotism is a principle, not a sentiment. It is a principle of devotion, and I cannot conceive of any principle of devotion which is not suitable to the object to which we are devoted. Shall I say that I am devoted to my friend and then shall I do my friend a dis-service? Shall I praise in him what I do not honestly admire? Shall I leave unpraised what I

think for his good? Shall I agree with him out of mere complaisance, and shall I show my friendship by such agreement? Surely that is not the principle of devotion. Devotion suits itself to its object and is careful to serve the thing served according to its character. And so I say that, although this principle of devotion breeds sentiment, it is a schooled and chastened sentiment. It is a sentiment which expresses itself in the wise and moderate counsels of real and thoughtful friendship.

If I were to undertake to describe what patriotism is, I should say that it is not a thing singular and apart, it is not a thing which we can separate from other like sentiments. When we speak of the character of a man as being unselfish, we have begun to describe him by the same terms that we would use in describing him as a patriot, for I take it that patriotism is grounded in what unselfishness is grounded in, namely, a certain energy of character expressing itself outside of the narrow circle of self-interest. We are not so small as to live only for ourselves. That is what we say to the world when we prove ourselves true friends; and when we prove ourselves true patriots we are but extending the circle of this principle of friendly interest and of energy expressed beyond the circle of self-interest. You know that when you describe a man's character as noble you are not thinking, I think I should be justified in saying that you are never thinking, of the things that he does for himself. Is it "noble" that a man should serve his own interests? It is necessary, it is desirable, it is in many forms praiseworthy; but do we describe it as noble that a man should serve himself? How does he differ from other men, and where is one man to be preferred to another in nobility, if it consists in serving one's self, for does not every man within the limits of his intelligence serve himself? No, when we say that a man is noble we mean that he serves something besides himself; that he has, if I may express it, a margin, a surplus, a free capital of character, which he can expend in undertakings which are for the general welfare as well as in undertakings for himself. He is not consumed and used up in serving himself; there is a generous remainder which he is ready to share with his neighbors

and with his fellow-citizens and with his friends. And so nobility is this fine exercise of one's quality outside of the narrow circle of self-interest.

It seems to me that it is but an extension of these terms when we speak of patriotism. Patriotism is this fine, unselfish exercise of energy, and it is not, as I began by saying, a mere expression of sentiment. You know that one of the drawbacks in speaking about patriotism is that a man has a certain self-consciousness of what he himself does and does not do, and he feels that the expression of noble purpose is in itself a cheap thing. How shall a man consent to have his own patriotism examined? He shrinks from that. He fears to be suspected of cheap sentiment, and to be challenged to show where he has realized it in action. His fear is an illustration of the principle that I am insisting upon, namely, that character does not show itself in the mere utterance of the sentiments of the lip. I have heard some excellent sentiments of patriotism associated with very base conduct. I have heard some very selfish purposes served by the expression of the sentiment of patriotism. We know that the sentiment itself is cheap, but that the duty is dear, and that when men express themselves in action we then for the first time uncover ourselves and know that we stand in the presence of men who serve their country as well as themselves. I take that to be one of the things which makes us stand with no word of criticism in the presence of the great admiral whom we have so recently been honoring, because we know that he did not undertake what he undertook for glory, but in the way of service.

I was very much interested in what one of our naval officers said to me the other day. He was expressing, I think with a little pique, his surprise at the astonishment of the country at the readiness of the navy for the war. "Why," he said, "I have been in the navy sixteen years, and all those sixteen years we have been ready to give a ball or go into battle in fifteen minutes." These men, therefore, have lived not to glorify themselves in this service, but as always ready for service, and when they have contained themselves after winning victories

we have known in how deep a sense they were serviceable men.

The moral obviously is, that we cannot serve our country, and no man can serve his country, unless we know what the country is and what it stands for. How shall I be patriotic, how shall any man be patriotic, who does not understand the object of his devotion? It is a more serious thing, it seems to me, to be a citizen of this country than to be a citizen of any other country, unless it be the country to which we are nearest akin; because I always remember when I think of this government of ours that interesting sentence in DeTocqueville in which he says: "One is startled to perceive the variety of information and the excellence of discretion which its Constitution presupposes in the people whom it is meant to govern." The variety of information; the excellence of discretion. You are trusting a great body of men to govern themselves, and you are thereby trusting them to understand their polity and to adopt a policy which is suitable to that polity. This excellence of discretion will not come without knowledge, without that variety of information which DeTocqueville associates with it; and it seems to me that the first and most noble characteristic of our polity is that it is a debating and an intellectual polity. I do not know of any other polity that depends upon nicer questions of law, upon nicer balances of arrangement, and therefore it is an intellectual polity, because it requires nicety of discrimination to be understood, and it also requires that a man should know the objects for which all this nice machinery is adjusted in order that he may not put it to the wrong uses and damage it in the using. It is a debating polity. Why? If you would know why it is a debating polity, you must remember how it originated.

We have seen a good many singular things happen recently. We have been told that it is unpatriotic to criticise public action. Well, if it is, then there is a deep disgrace resting upon the origins of this nation. This nation originated in the sharpest sort of criticism of public policy. We originated, to put it in the vernacular, in a kick, and if it be unpatriotic to kick, why, then, the grown man is unlike the child. We have forgotten the very

principle of our origin if we have forgotten how to object, how to resist, how to agitate, how to pull down and build up, even to the extent of revolutionary practices if it be necessary, to readjust matters. I have forgotten my history if that be not true history. When I see schoolrooms full of children, going through genuflections to the flag of the United States, I am willing to bend the knee if I be permitted to understand what history has written upon the folds of that flag. If you will teach the children what the flag stands for, I am willing that they should go on both knees to it. But they will get up with opinions of their own; they will not get up with the opinions which happen to be the opinions of those who are instructing them. They will get up critical. They will get up determined to have opinions of their own. They will know that this is a flag of liberty of opinion, as well as of political liberty in questions of organization.

I am not saying this because I am as much disposed as some are to criticise recent events, but because I love, more deeply than I love anything else, the right of other men to hold opinions different from my own. If I had to live among men who always agreed with me I know what the consequences would be on my character and development, and I do not wish to live in any so placid and complaisant a community. I wish the rigorous airs of differences of opinion, and, if I am not able to fight it out for myself, I want some better champion on my side. A man's muscles are made, as I understand it, for use, for contention, for triumph, and I take it that his opinions are made for the same thing. We belong, therefore, to a contesting, a debating, an intellectual polity, where difference of opinion is, as it were, a sort of mandate of conscience, and where things prosper and are purified, because there are differences of opinion, and not because there is unity in opinion. That is the rigorous condition upon which we live. I believe that the weakness of the American character is that there are so few growlers and kickers amongst us. We would be better served, from the street cars up, if we were all of us accustomed to make things very disagreeable (laughter). You know that Mr. Bagehot very wittily said, that the freedom of the English Constitution consisted in

this, that all sorts of conveniences were afforded for making it disagreeable for the men who were governing the country; and it is because of the instinctive desire of persons to get agreeable conditions to live under that governors are conformable to the general opinion of those whom they are governing. We have heard that the government of France, under the old régime, was limited by epigram, because a laugh at its expense made the court feel uneasy, and so the court was guided in such a way as to avoid a too disagreeable laugh. Such are the conditions of conformity to the opinions of a people, and this is the sort of polity that we live under, and I rejoice in that fact.

But it lays a burden upon the teacher, such as can be laid under no other polity in respect to the matter that we have to discuss, namely, education in patriotism. I suppose that on the face of it it sounds absurd to say that you are educating people in patriotism, but it sounds absurd only if you regard patriotism merely as a sentiment. I do not know how to educate persons in generous sentiment; I know how to educate people in fear. You can make people afraid of you, if you have power enough and are disagreeable enough, but I do not know any means of making people love you—I mean deliberately; for every man remembers the days of his youth when he tried the experiment (laughter). There is no known prescription by which you can compel anybody to love you. The generous, sympathetic sentiments are not subject to compulsion. The fearful sentiments, the timorous sentiments, and the base sentiments are subject to compulsion, but you would not class patriotism with them. Patriotism is a bold and aggressive and initiative sentiment, and it is a sentiment of sympathy, above all things, and you cannot compel a sentiment of sympathy unless you display the lovable qualities which inhere in the object which you would have loved; and then you know that, if they be properly displayed, it shall be a poor spirit that does not feel its love called forth, and that it is a matter of despair to lead a nation which will not love lovely things. So that the object of the teacher, it seems to me, in matters of patriotism, should be to show what is inherent and essential in the character of American institutions, and so call

out those generous sentiments which must rise at the sight of lovely objects.

And yet you will see at once that the essential objects, the essential characteristics of our government, are very abstract things. They are things which are not only abstract, but, which is worse, are abstract *and familiar*. After you have rubbed an abstraction over by constant handling it becomes almost impossible to retain it in your hand. It has become so slippery, so worn with use, so handled by the inexperienced fingers of men, that it is covered over with all sorts of accretions and mistakes and it is the more difficult to recognize because it has been so much dealt with. I conceive the three central abstractions which lie in the character of our government to be these: Self-government, liberty, and equality. What man, what child, does not have to be dispossessed of prepossessions with regard to these three things? How much mistaken talk there has been about all of them. Most of the mistakes have been committed in this country, because we have supposed that self-government—we have not supposed it really, because we, after all, are not insane, but we have talked as if we supposed—that self-government and liberty and equality originated, were born and nursed in this country. No man who knows any history, or, rather, who chooses to recollect his history when he is talking about these things, can imagine that that is true. We did not originate these desirable things. We did not originate liberty or self-government. Some people think we never have invented equality yet. And we talk about these things as if, should they not be found here, it were impossible to find them anywhere. That is the first thing we have to dispossess our thought of. Any teacher who teaches a child that the flag of the United States is the only flag that stands for self-government and liberty and equality is teaching a radical error. We believe, I certainly believe, that the most serviceable forms of self-government and liberty and equality have been found under the institutions of this country; but that is all that I can say. It is a matter of comparative excellence; it is not a matter of originality or of absolute excellence. And so you have to teach your children where self-government came

from and what it is, where liberty came from and what it is, where equality came from and what it is, and I take it that that is a very difficult matter.

I was led to this conclusion in preparing to make this address to you. I have never realized before so clearly as I think I realize now what the task involves; and I was naturally led to think, therefore, upon the possibility of this sort of instruction. Shall you teach young children these abstract matters of self-government and liberty and equality? And it came into my mind as I thought that it would be possible to write a book. I am not going to write it; I should have to start over again and be a bigger man; but it would be possible for a man of the right caliber to write a book which would be an incomparable suggestor of patriotism. If he were to write it so that self-government would shine in attractive instances, as concrete as the life in the midst of which we live; if he would embody liberty in the story of great passages of liberty; if he would embody equality in the fortunes of men who had lived and whose biographies we familiarly knew, he would bring these things into very life before the eyes of those who looked, because the advantage that we have in teaching these things is that we have instances at hand. I take it that French teachers could have no instances at hand of these things. I am not willing to disparage the French character, for it has many traits which we may envy, but I have noticed, in the books which I am condemned because of my profession to read, that those writers who live in countries that have not had real self-government find the questions of self-government very easy to treat. I find that politics is simplicity itself with the men who have never lived any part of politics, and that it is difficult for us to speak of these things because we are "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." We remember a few things, we have tried a few things, we know a few men, and we know how unlovely the mass of men are who profess these splendid principles. We have attended mass meetings of our fellow-citizens and we know of what stuff they are made and by what passions they are moved; and we know that, although you may know every man in your neighborhood, if you

gather all those men in a mass meeting they will do something to surprise you. You know that the orbits of political bodies are absolutely incalculable, that the only thing you can be sure of is some sort of an eclipse (laughter), some sort of an obscuration, particularly of heavenly bodies (laughter). And, therefore, we have an advantage and a disadvantage. We can express these things in terms of life, but the difficulty is to express them in simple terms of life, such as we could imagine them expressible in if we did not know life as well as we know it. We have the disadvantage of being workmen in the stuff and knowing how unmalleable it really is, and yet the advantage of having all handled the stuff and knowing in the main what it is like. We are, therefore, safer when we think in individual instances than when we think in the abstract.

Now I think there are a few points which we can illustrate to children or to anybody else. In the first place, with regard to self-government, for I want to be very practical indeed. In regard to self-government we can illustrate the point that it is not in its essence democratic. If it were, when did it begin? You know that self-government runs back, at any rate, as far as Magna Charta. Did England have democratic institutions immediately after Magna Charta, and has she had democratic institutions during most of the period from Magna Charta down to the present time? Certainly not. And yet the history of self-government is the history of England in mediaeval and modern times, until this government was established; and ours is a very recent and modern growth. It is very easy to show children self-government, if England had it, is not necessarily democratic. You can show them if you will tell them stories about English justices of the peace—and you can get plenty of them—that English self-government in local matters consisted in the administration of those matters by appointed justices of the peace down to the year 1888; that so far as national affairs were concerned, it consisted in an imperfect system of representation down to 1832, and a not very much more perfect system since 1832; and that down to 1888 it consisted in government, administrative government all along the line, by men appointed

by the Crown, the principal country gentlemen of their neighborhood. That certainly is not democratic. Why do you call it *self-government*, then? You call it self-government because it is a participation by non-official persons in the conduct of affairs; by persons who, in the case of justices of the peace, got no pay for it, made no profession of it, were appointed because of their importance in the locality, and not because of their connection with the national government; who were not officers of the central government in the sense that modern administrative officers are. And you can show that during much of the period of representation in Parliament it was merely a talking body and not a legislative body, and that its advantage was that it made the rulers feel uncomfortable rather than that they told them what they had to do. You can illustrate these things by concrete instances taken out of Parliament. Can you not describe situations in the history of England, and can you not describe how certain fearless men stood up in Parliament, under dramatic circumstances which any child's imagination will take fire at, and told the situation and made the government intolerably uncomfortable? Can you not describe that struggle, that critical struggle, between self-government and autocratic government, which came when Cromwell turned out the Parliament? Can you not find instances dramatic enough for any use all up and down English history to show how the English layman, as contrasted with the official, pressed himself into affairs and spoke his mind, and can you not make even children understand that the opportunity of laymen to speak their mind about affairs and get heard upon a public forum is self-government? That is the chief and essential feature of it. Just so long as European governments choke off discussion and put men in prison because of their opinions about personages in high places, they may have never so perfect a system of representation, and never so modern a constitution, and be without self-government. Self-government is the free expression of lay, non-official opinion, and I know of no other essential characteristic about it; and that is the dramatic characteristic, that is the characteristic which is concrete and illustrative

Now, you will say, if this is true of self-government—and I ask you to excuse me from a further examination of that point and simply leave it with you in order to show you what grows out of that, which you can also illustrate—if this is the essence of self-government, this non-official participation in saying what ought to be done, and saying it in a voice and from a place where men are sure of a hearing, why, then, it presupposes, and has back of it individual capacity, has it not? It has back of it some leisure for affairs, has it not? It has back of it a spirit of honor and of devotion. These are qualities which can be illustrated out of biography in a way which will quicken any pulse—devotion to affairs, the devoting of high capacity to affairs, the pledging of unimpeachable honor in affairs, the devotion of leisure to affairs; and I believe that one reason that self-government has gone some crooked courses in this country is because we have had so few men of leisure, and so few men of leisure that we did have have devoted themselves to the free expression of opinion in public affairs. Who is the man whom the politician fears? The man whom it is no use to turn out of office. If in order to have a voice in affairs you must occupy office, the politician can silence you, because he can intrigue you out of office; but if you are going to have leisure and determination enough to keep on talking, and are going to have invitations to talk in public places, whether you are in office or out of office, what good does it do to turn you out of office? These are the men who make the scheming politician infinitely uncomfortable. If you can snap your finger in his face and say, "Give me the office, or give it to some one else and I will be a thorn in your side nevertheless," why, he will give you a berth, and if you will not prick too much he will give you a good deal of your way in affairs. We all know that when Mr. Roosevelt—for concrete instances are the most interesting—consorted with Mr. Platt, we grew uncomfortable; but Mr. Platt was a great deal more uncomfortable than we were (laughter and applause). They were bedfellows, but a thorn is an uncomfortable bedfellow. Although they were going the same course together, it was necessary that Mr. Platt should give himself less latitude of movement than he had given himself

before. Why? Because this popular, this gifted man, this man whom all the nation was willing to hear speak, whether they agreed with him or not, was too big a man to have it make any difference to him whether he was in office or out of office. If he had not been governor of New York, the governor of New York would have been eminently uncomfortable because he was not, and so he would have had an important part in that governorship whether he possessed the office or did not possess the office. We may agree with Mr. Roosevelt and admire him, or not agree with him and not admire him; that is a matter of indifference to my argument. My argument is that, being a man of leisure, who can find leisure enough and energy enough to talk about affairs whether he has office or not, he is the sort of man who can carry the burdens of self-government without the assistance of machinery; and, in proportion as such men are multiplied, will pure self-government, thoroughly discussed and honestly conducted, be assured us.

Which leads to another useful observation. Not only is self-government not necessarily democratic, though I believe that democracy is the soundest basis for it, but self-government, and democratic self-government, is like every other polity in the world, though it be monarchical and despotic, in this, that the burdens of it rest upon a minority. There never has been and there never will be a government that is conducted by the majority. The majority may make all the noise they please, and a very small number of persons govern in affairs. That must always be the case. And no man, no minority, can be successful in affairs—I do not mean a minority in the ordinary sense, the minority who cannot get the rest of a community to vote with them, but the minority who are actually active in affairs and influential in affairs—no minority that carries the burden of government under any polity can afford to give over attention to affairs and attend to them only at intervals. We are too much inclined to govern by committees of 100, who generally are doing nothing. If you go into the game of politics, you must go in to be there year in and year out, campaign or no campaign, having a passion for attending to the details as well

as to the greater issues, and it is only upon this condition that you shall have a sound and working polity. This means that men of leisure must devote themselves to affairs. You have, therefore, personal capacity, personal honor, leisure, and these things are susceptible of illustration in concrete instances. There is no child that cannot understand those things. When expressed in terms of conduct, of individual conduct, self-government is no longer an abstraction, it is a personal duty, and the man ought to stay awake at nights who does not realize it as a personal duty. I maintain that the man who does not exercise his notion of self-government as a personal duty ought to shut his mouth as a critic. Who is he? What has he done? Where has he spoken? A man may have the most unimpeachable sentiments in the world and he is not a good citizen unless he tries to get those sentiments adopted.

That is the rigorous condition of self-government. You shall not have exercised your duty until you have tried to make your opinions prevalent. It is a matter of agitation, and agitation is disagreeable. It is not everybody that likes to speak to a hostile audience. I think the best spirits sometimes like hostility a little better than sympathy, because it gets the fighting blood up in them and they do their thinking as if for life or for death. But that is insisting upon the impact of your thought upon other minds that do not like that impact; it is making yourself disagreeable in the long run to the vast majority of the people with whom you associate.

Now as to liberty. Liberty does not seem to me an abstraction. It goes without saying—it is a commonplace to say—that liberty is not the withdrawing of all restraints. Liberty is having just restraint enough. Do we say that a boat sails free when she is not restrained by the wind? Is it not her obedience to the wind that makes her free? Is it not her obedience to the great forces moving about her that puts her own faculties, for she seems fairly to possess faculties, at her disposal? When Emerson poetically bids us hitch our wagons to a star, he means that we must go in the direction in which the solar system is going or else we will get run over. My physical freedom

depends upon my obedience to the laws of nature. Am I free to move? It is because I have been trained since a toddling child to obey the laws of equilibrium, the laws of attraction, the laws of gravitation. I am a living embodiment and illustration of the laws of gravitation, and that makes me free. If I disobeyed the laws of nature, ate what I ought not to eat, how immediate my slavery would be. If you want to know when you are a slave, count the number of times the doctor visits you. You have committed an indiscretion by not being conformable to the laws of nature, and you have forfeited your liberty in respect of that, and nature says to you, "Thou fool."

It seems to me that liberty is illustrated more nearly than we at first think by such illustrations as this. Liberty is the best adjustment between governmental power and individual initiative. It does not consist in individual initiative, look you; it consists in not letting individual initiative go too far and, on the other hand, in not letting governmental power act with too arbitrary a choice of means. And it seems to me that the despotism of the despot consists in the last analysis of this, that you cannot calculate today what he is going to do tomorrow, because he will do tomorrow what he pleases without consulting you. He may be gracious to you today and send you to the block tomorrow, and you want to know how to calculate your orbit so as not to run athwart the block. You know what lawyers say. Lawyers say that swift and consistent injustice is better than slow and inconsistent justice. It is a great deal better that you should be able to know and make your calculations beforehand, know where the government is coming and where you can come, know which is your field and which is the field of government, so that there shall not be collision; and this adjustment constitutes your liberty. In proportion as the adjustment is the best adjustment (and we have never found what the best adjustment is), you have the best and completest liberty; because it is a social question and not an individual question. Do you think that Robinson Crusoe was a particularly free man? Would you be as free as you are now if you had to get and cook all your own food, and make your clothes and hats and shoes, and build

your own house? Do you think you would be as free a man then as under the coöperative system under which you live? Freedom is a social question and your faculties are set free on the condition that most things are taken care of by somebody else. You do not run the greater part of the arrangements of the world, and you thank your stars that you do not, because it leaves you, you say, free; it leaves you free to occupy your own individual little corner and do your own individual little tasks. That is your freedom, that you are a member of the coöperative society which we call the body politic.

There is a passage of Burke's that is pertinent in this connection, and whenever Burke can be read he ought to be read. "I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France," he says in his *Reflections on the French Revolution* (I never have been able to understand how people thought that that was a hysterical production; but then some people have not read it), "I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France until I was informed how it had been combined with government." He has just had an eloquent passage in which he admits, more eloquently than we could admit, all the excellence of liberty; but he could not congratulate a nation upon its liberty until he knew how it was combined with other things just as excellent, "combined with government, with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social manners." Liberty is like the ingredients in our food; it is excellent in mixture and not by itself, and in proportion as it is happily compounded you shall have an excellent thing.

You will observe, therefore, in looking down the illustrative parts of history in this connection, this circumstance. Men have seldom been unfree taking whole societies at a time. There is in almost every society, no matter how undeveloped the idea of liberty may be, some free class. And liberty has had a history of percolation downwards; so that class after class which had formerly been depressed and subordinate was elevated and put

upon an equality with others in the enjoyment of this right balance between individual privilege and public power. Most of the time what has been going on has been this : that the privileged class which was free did not sympathetically understand or care for the conditions precedent to the liberty of the classes underneath them. There have been periods in history when it was perfectly evident that the governing class wished to take beneficent action for those who were depressed below them, but wished it in ignorance of what really was for the benefit of those depressed below them. Liberty has consisted in the widening of the idea, not that some men should have their privilege adjusted to the public power, but that as many men as possible should have their individual privileges rightly adjusted to the public power. The history of liberty has been a history of the spreading of an idea which men, some men, have entertained from the first, and of a thing which some classes have enjoyed from the first.

So that liberty depends upon what we have hitherto pretty nearly had in this country ; and that is the reason, it seems to me, that this has been the home of liberty more distinctively, I think we are permitted to say, than other countries. You are pretty sure to have a universal acceptance of this idea, that every man is entitled to have a right adjustment between his privileges and the public power, in a country where the conditions of life are tolerably uniform, where there is no great economic or social advantage in the position of one set of men as contrasted with another, where the conditions are uniform enough to make it easy for every man to think in terms suitable to the whole community rather than in terms suitable only to the class to which he belongs in the community. Where you have equality of condition, or something like equality of condition, you have uniformity of thinking with respect to this essential matter. It is perfectly possible to illustrate to the youngest mind, it seems to me, this conception, that in order to have liberty men must consent to think of other men as they think of themselves ; and that it may be shown that, although the Golden Rule is imperative upon all men, it is easiest to follow in a society of tolerable

uniform economic conditions. How can I wish to do unto others as I would have them do unto me unless I know what will be beneficial to them and unless they know what will be beneficial to me? I cannot think in the terms of their experience unless I am near enough to their experience to think so spontaneously and without too great an effort of the imagination, because the imagination is a very much dwarfed faculty in most persons, particularly the social imagination. I do not know anything that needs a nicer schooling than the ability to see the conditions under which other men live, and think for other men in the terms of their conditions. That is the reason that most charity mis-carries, because we cannot think of the persons to whom we would be helpful in the terms of their lives and therefore do not know how to help them. If you have a community such as this has for the most part of its history been, where men have been constantly moving from class to class and where men of the most eminent position have been at some time in a very humble position, you have a community where it is easy for men to think in the terms of each other, and therefore you have a country in which liberty is most likely to be diffused. And you have another thing. You have a community which is able to understand the general welfare as contrasted with the individual welfare. If you have movable atoms in the mass and they have experienced the atmosphere of different parts of the mass, you can explain the general atmosphere of the mass to them and they will understand, because they have been there themselves.

It is just exactly like traveling. A man after he has traveled over this country and seen his fellow-citizens in distant parts of the continent is ashamed of himself for having been so narrow a creature before he traveled, for having thought such ignorant thoughts and such superior thoughts about his fellow-citizens. The best dose for the man who would be a thinking man is to see the people he is thinking about and see the parts of the country he is thinking about, and going to see for himself what is "the matter with Kansas," because just so soon as he does he comes back *pari passu* a Kansan himself, and he is able to tell you, if he has had eyes and is an honest man, he is almost as able to

tell you as if he had lived in Kansas, what is "the matter with Kansas." It is just so in moving from class to class as well as from place to place. Men who have experienced the various conditions of the societies in which they live are men who, when they are constituent parts of a political meeting, can understand the general welfare when it is explained to them, because they know the various parts and elements that go to make up the general welfare. You can illustrate this sympathy, you can illustrate this interrelationship of class, you can illustrate this common experience, you can illustrate all the terms of the simple life of this nation, better than you can illustrate the variety that is in the life of other nations; and the task of teaching the ideal liberty, that is to say, an equal adjustment of private privilege to public power, is easier here than it is anywhere else.

And then what about equality? What is equality? We no longer entertain the opinions that we used to entertain about the Declaration of Independence. There used to be a time when we took the Declaration of Independence literally; but we don't, we take it now in a Pickwickian sense. At any rate, if we believe that all men are born free and equal, we know that the freedom and equality stops at their birth (laughter), because we see what men would be blind not to see, and what of course Mr. Jefferson saw as clearly as we see, that after you have once put men upon this starting line of birth and set them on their course they do not remain equal, the one outruns the other, the achievement of one is not matchable with the achievement of another, and at the goal there is disparity, though at the starting line there may have been equality. We are not deceiving ourselves any longer by supposing that we can ever invent a machinery of government which will keep the slow runners up with the fast runners. And, moreover, we want to see a race (great laughter). We believe that the best training is in competition. We believe that keen competition is the growth of the individual, and we would not so dwarf ourselves as to give every man a handicap that would make him equal with every other man. And so we know, when we ask ourselves what we mean by equality, that we mean exactly what the sportsman means when he says "A fair

field and no favor." That is all that we mean by political equality, all that it is practicable that we should mean.

What we object to in government is that it should show favor to some contestants for the prize, that it should put some men under easier conditions for competing than other men are put under. The reason we criticise the existing economic order is not because it does not give every man the same benefit of labor, but because we see that in some particulars it creates artificial advantages in competition for some men from which other men are shut out. It is not a fair field and there is favor. That is the reason we do not want lobbyists in our legislatures. That is the reason we do not want money spent in elections. That is the reason we do not want the men who already have money to have all the advantage that money is to get. It is because there is not a fair field and there is favor that we are troubled about affairs. If we can invent means, as we shall invent means, I feel confident—because so long as my digestion holds I am an optimist (laughter)—we shall find means, I firmly believe, to equalize the field at the start, so that there shall be a fair field, no interference even by the spectators, much less by the authorities of the course, and no favor shown to any contestant. That is the essence of equality. It is the equality of chance, of opportunity, and not the equality of results, for we should have a dead uniformity and the absence of growth if there were equality in result.

I have detained you long enough, it seems to me, in the illustration of what is, after all, obvious enough, but I have done so because I wished to make you appreciate, as it seems to me it is easy to appreciate, how concrete all of these things are. What characteristic and representative American biography does not illustrate this sort of equality? You can take the biography that most of all represents America, the biography of Lincoln, and there you have a man originating in a class from which we expected to find initiative stamped out, ambition long ago dead, a man from that class coming to be a prince among men because there was a fair field and no favor, and blood and origin did not shut a man out, and merit and endeavor were the only things

that told. Is not that an example of equality? The adult, and I think the child also, will rejoice in the apparent paradox: the supremacy of Lincoln, the fact that he stands higher than the rest of us, is an illustration of equality. We all have the chance, if we have but fiber for it, to get to the same pedestal, and it is only when there is a fence around the pedestal and everybody is forbidden to compete for it that there is no equality.

But there is something else besides the understanding of these fundamentals which is necessary, it seems to me, to understand and to teach patriotism, and that is the right critical temper. And let me say it, I say it with the greater freedom because I am a teacher myself, I think that teachers find it more difficult than others to preserve a right critical temper about affairs, because they do the easiest thing in the world, they read books. It is easy to be wise out of books, but it is infinitely difficult to be wise in the midst of affairs. The man who sits in the calmness and stillness of a study and cavils at a man who is in the midst of the infinitely various and difficult affairs of the actual arena of public matters should be very careful to revise his judgments before he utters them and to realize the difficulties before he condemns the man. You must teach people, you must teach yourself, every man must teach himself, to learn from looking upon the face of affairs and from understanding the characters of the actors upon the stage upon which you yourselves are moving, as well as the easy task of reading out of biographies and recording past events. How often have we seen in the biographies of men dead and gone, the sufficient explanation, the honorable explanation, for things which we condemned in them while they lived, and why is it that we, if we stand near to some men in the midst of the rush of public affairs, are lenient critics of them, and those who did not see them in their private lives are harsh critics of them? Because those who did not know them do not know their tempers and do not understand their motives. We should all of us try by imagination to be statesmen ourselves, not with regard to questions which are settled, but with regard to questions which are pendent, and

then we shall know what is the hard school for the right temper, the right critical temper in affairs.

There is a great deal of point, it seems to me, in this: we are constantly dissatisfied because, when we criticise affairs people will say to us, "Well, what would you do? What do you suggest?" and we say, "We have nothing to suggest, we just do not like what is being done." I say that that is very trying; but you must really submit to that if you are going to have any place in affairs. If you have nothing to propose it is not instructive that you should say that you do not like what is being done. When teachers stand up and say to their pupils, "These men did wrong," it is their business to say what it would have been right for these men to do "What would you have done under the circumstances?" That is the hardest question in the world, and yet it is the only question that is worth answering in affairs. I am not interested in your opinion; nobody is interested in your negative opinion. If you have something to suggest, suggest it. You know that Mr. Bagehot wittily said that the French, with their excellent gift of language, could say anything, but that they did not have anything to say; and it was Mr. Birrell who said: "If you would have me believe you a wit, I must really trouble you to make a joke." Now, if you would really have me believe that you are wise in affairs I must really trouble you to suggest something, because it is only by positive action, and not by criticism alone, that affairs are conducted. There is a function for mere negative criticism, that is to say, there is a function for more destruction, to bring men who are doing foolish things to a consciousness of their folly, but do not propose this criticism as statesmanship until you have something better to suggest. I am not now squinting at pending questions, that would be impertinent under these circumstances; I am simply stating plainly what I conceive to be the proper position of the teacher. You have no business teaching patriotism or touching upon affairs unless you have the temper and the frame of mind to stand in the midst of affairs, and you have no place in the midst of affairs unless you have these practical standards of judgment. Something must be done, and you

must get the right critical attitude toward things that are proposed.

I realize, ladies and gentlemen, that I have simply given you a very rough outline of matters which need very much more careful elaboration and statement than I have given them, but my object has been simply to assist, if I may, in some small degree, your thinking in this matter, and not to furnish a body of doctrine. I esteem it a privilege to have addressed this audience, and I thank you most sincerely for your attention.

MORNING SESSION

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1899

The association met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9 A. M., and proceeded with its business meeting.

THE PRESIDENT: The hour having come for the presentation of the subject, "The Continuous Moral Influence of the School through College and through Life," I desire to say that the committee which had charge of the preparation of the proceedings of this meeting felt sure that they had in this subject one interesting to all members of the association, college men and school men alike, and they were also sure that they had selected to present this subject a person admirably qualified to deal with it. I present to you the Rev. Endicott Peabody of Groton School.

THE CONTINUOUS MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE SCHOOL THROUGH COLLEGE AND THROUGH LIFE

By ENDICOTT PEABODY,
Of Groton School

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have heard the story told of a man that he had so much to do that he went fishing. I am sure we are all agreed that that was written of the schoolmaster. As I approached this subject, it seemed to me that it must have been written of one who attempted this theme